2014-01-19 - RECENT COURT-RELATED ASPROX BOTNET PHISHING EMAILS
ASSOCIATED FILES:
- ZIP of the PCAP: 2014-01-19-asprox-traffic-from-infected-host.pcap.zip
- ZIP file of the malware: 2014-01-19-asprox-malware.zip
NOTES:
What can be said about the Asprox botnet that hasn't already been discussed?
- http://garwarner.blogspot.com/2013/12/asprox-spamming-court-related-malware.html
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Mr+Jones+wants+you+to+appear+in+court+/17279
- http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/RelatedThreats.aspx?language=en&name=Asprox+Botnet+Reemerges+in+the+Form+of+KULUOZ
- http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-asprox-reborn.pdf
For this blog entry, I'm covering the Asprox court-related emails with ZIP attachments that started on 23 Dec 2013.
Properly implemented spam filtering should catch any Asprox-related attachments; however, you should also monitor what's being blocked. Criminal operations like this tend to evolve over time.
Let's review two samples from this past week...
WEDNESDAY 2014-01-15
Date: 2014-01-15
Spoofed email sender ends with: @gtlaw.com
Subject lines start with:
- #Hearing of your case in Court N#
- Notice of appearance in court N#
- Notice to appear in court N#
- Urgent court notice N#
EMAIL EXAMPLE:
From: Notice to Appear <service.489@gtlaw.com>
Date: Wednesday, January 15, 2014 1:54 PM CST
Subject: Notice to appear in court N#1019-846
Notice to Appear,
Hereby you are notified that you have been scheduled to appear for your hearing that
will take place in the court of New York in January 21, 2014 at 10:00 am.
Please bring all documents and witnesses relating to this case with you to Court on your hearing date.
The copy of the court notice is attached to this letter.
Please, read it thoroughly.
Note: If you do not attend the hearing the judge may hear the case in your absence.
Yours truly,
Donna Mason
Clerk to the Court.
Attachment: Court_Notice_NY_15_01_2014_Copy_514.zip (200.2 KB)
MALWARE:
Extracted executable file name: Court_Notice_New_York_15_01_2014_copy.exe
File size: 236.5 KB ( 242176 bytes )
MD5 hash: 9f4cebaf343cd94b1e45cbb902a16d1f
Detection ratio: 34 / 48
First submission: 2014-01-15 16:25:16 GMT
VirusTotal link: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b947f0ec017c0565aaf3203ba0fcea66957ea908bb10feecc66050275e9db97b/analysis/
Malwr analysis: https://malwr.com/analysis/ZmIzYjQ0YzE0ZmZiNGNlZmI3NThjNzVjMmNjNDg1NDM/
FRIDAY 2014-01-17
Date: 2014-01-17
Spoofed email sender ends with: @cgsh.com
Subject lines start with:
- Court attendance notification No
- Court notification No
- Hearing of your case in Court
- Illegal software use No
- Illegal software use number No
- Judicial summons No
- Notice of appearance in court No
- Notice of court attendance No
- Pretrial notice No
- Urgent court notice
EMAIL EXAMPLE:
From: Court hearing notice <support.4@cgsh.com>
Date: Friday, January 17, 2014 4:18 PM CST
Subject: Pretrial notice No8516
Court hearing notice.
As a defendant you have been scheduled
to attend the hearing in the Court of New York.
Hearing date: 28 January 2014
Hearing time: 9:00 a.m.
Hearing subject: illegal use of software.
Prior to the court thoroughly study the plaint note in the attachment to this mail.
Sincerely,
Court agent,
Lily Smith
Attachment: Plaint_Note_US_Copy_N0213.zip (201.4 KB)
MALWARE:
Extracted file name: Plaint_Note_17_01_2014US_Copy_Document.exe
File size: 236.5 KB ( 242176 bytes )
MD5 hash: 960a0b9ef72c33a0df913564c99f07ec
Detection ratio: 29 / 48
First submission: 2014-01-17 20:47:57 GMT
VirusTotal link: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/42f7ae44c8017ba46536593a659aa8262ccd95a4424ea1e798e63530b697bb7f/analysis/
Malwr analysis: https://malwr.com/analysis/NzEyOTk4NjkyNzE2NGVkMWJlYTI3YzBmNDAwM2EwM2M/
TRAFFIC FROM AN INFECTED HOST
I took the malware from Friday the 17th and executed it on a physical host. The physical host was running an unpatched version of Windows 7 SP 1. After a few minutes, I saw 3 suspicious artifacts from the traffic:
With Security Onion monitoring the infected physical host, the following alerts that triggered on Sguil:
- 18:17:52 GMT - local_host port 49365 -> 168.144.82.97 port 80 - PADS New Asset - http Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:25.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/25.0
- 18:17:52 GMT - local_host port 49365 -> 168.144.82.97 port 80 - ET CURRENT_EVENTS Kuluoz/Asprox Activity Dec 23 2013
- 18:18:04 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 -> local_host port 49369 - ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download
- 18:18:04 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 -> local_host port 49369 - ET INFO EXE - Served Attached HTTP
- 18:18:04 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 -> local_host port 49369 - ET MALWARE Possible Windows executable sent when remote host claims to send a Text File
The first event is just a notification for a new asset on the network. It shows Firefox 25; however, the physical host infected with this malware does not have Firefox installed. that's the Asprox malware speaking.
The second event is an EmergingThreats signature covering callback traffic from this Asprox malware.
The last three events were caused by a fake Java update downloaded by the infected host.
MALWARE-RELATED TRAFFIC SEEN ON THE PHYSICAL HOST:
- 18:17:30 GMT - local_host port 49365 - 168.144.82.97 port 8080 - no domain - POST /05CF1B1FFD537F391EDD182E8820B1D884A674EE18
- 18:17:35 GMT - 168.144.82.97 port 8080 - local_host port 49365 - HTTP/1.1 404 NOT FOUND
- 18:17:35 GMT - local_host port 49366 - 91.109.6.209 port 8080 - no domain - POST /05CF1B1FFD537F391EDD182E8820B1D884A674EE18
- 18:17:39 GMT - 91.109.6.209 port 8080 - local_host port 49366 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
- 18:17:40 GMT - local_host port 49367 - 193.105.210.113 port 80 - net-translscl.com - GET /b/shoe/159
- 18:17:41 GMT - 193.105.210.113 port 80 - local_host port 49367 - HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
- 18:17:41 GMT - local_host port 49368 - 193.105.210.113 port 80 - net-translscl.com - GET /b/shoe/159
- 18:17:42 GMT - 193.105.210.113 port 80 - local_host port 49368 - HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
- 18:17:43 GMT - local_host port 49369 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - king-orbit.com - GET /libs12.21/jquery/
- 18:17:43 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49369 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/plain)
- 18:19:30 GMT - local_host port 49157 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - king-orbit.com - GET /soft64.dll
- 18:19:31 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49157 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-msdos-program)
- 18:19:35 GMT - local_host port 49159 - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - presto-uniel.com - GET /b/eve/eca8f23b6b1e6b53b4fdffff
- 18:19:45 GMT - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - local_host port 49159 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
- 18:20:29 GMT - local_host port 49160 - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - presto-uniel.com - POST /b/opt/5CD26C0453546FEBD4E2F683
- 18:20:30 GMT - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - local_host port 49160 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
- 18:20:30 GMT - local_host port 49161 - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - presto-uniel.com - GET /b/letr/7582386B5B1C98AEDCAA01C6
- 18:20:31 GMT - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - local_host port 49161 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
- 18:20:31 GMT - local_host port 49162 - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - presto-uniel.com - POST /b/opt/D8E37252F583B3CF72352AA7
- 18:20:33 GMT - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - local_host port 49162 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
- 18:20:49 GMT - local_host port 49163 - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - presto-uniel.com - POST /b/req/540E8CBB69A764F5EE11FD9D
- 18:20:51 GMT - 178.75.86.234 port 80 - local_host port 49163 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
I also noted this in the traffic which might be related:
- 18:21:53 GMT - local_host port 49167 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - c-hcnumfind.net - GET /
- 18:21:53 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49167 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
- 18:21:54 GMT - local_host port 49169 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - c-hcnumfind.net - GET /style.css
- 18:21:54 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49169 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/css)
- 18:21:54 GMT - local_host port 49170 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - c-hcnumfind.net - GET /btn_search.png
- 18:21:54 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49170 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
- 18:21:54 GMT - local_host port 49171 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - c-hcnumfind.net - GET /logo.png
- 18:21:54 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49171 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
- 18:21:54 GMT - local_host port 49172 - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - c-hcnumfind.net - GET /icon_serch.png
- 18:21:55 GMT - 109.163.239.226 port 80 - local_host port 49172 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
ASSOCIATED DOMAINS:
- 168.144.82.97 (Canada, Softcom Technology consulting) - no domain name
- 91.109.6.209 (UK, WebFusion Internet solutions) - no domain name
- 109.163.239.226 (Russia, Voxility) - king-orbit.com (Majorova G Natalja, Romania)
- 193.105.210.113 (Ukraine, FOP Budko Dmutro Pavlovich) - net-translscl.com (Majorova G Natalja, Romania)
- 178.75.86.234 (Russia, Rostelecom) - presto-uniel.com (Patrick D. McCoy, Florida, US)
- 109.163.239.226 (Russia, Voxility) - c-hcnumfind.net (privacy-protected)
First suspicious HTTP request--possibly a malware binary:
Second suspicious HTTP request--returned malware binary that showed up as a fake Java update:
Third suspicious HTTP request--probably a malware binary:
DROPPED FILES
The PCAP shows an executable being sent being sent as exe.exe (see the image above for second suspicious HTTP request), and on the physical host, it showed up as a fake Java update and asked if you wanted to execute the program. Here's the summary for that piece of malware:
File names: Java_Update_139b0409.exe
File size: 154.8 KB ( 158521 bytes )
MD5 hash: 19985476c30f7d00d47abf2569bd6229
Detection ratio: 1 / 48
First submission: 2014-01-19 15:11:10 GMT
VirusTotal link: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/83b4095113e74ddd40c129d87415a240157b0d0f888e8df156d955c0f1713d80/analysis/
Malwr analysis: https://malwr.com/analysis/M2IyYmMzMTdiNWQ3NGUxZjkwMGVjZDY0ZGY5OWZlOTc/
I also noticed two dropped EXE files on the infected host:
- C:\Users\User-1\Appdata\Local\bpcagsrb.exe (where the original Asprox malware copied and renamed itself)
- C:\Users\User-1\Appdata\Local\eetbgffs.exe (generated callback traffic to king-orbit.com and net-translscl.com)
File name: eetbgffs.exe
File size: 79.8 KB ( 81721 bytes )
MD5 hash: 7940e3f197d448cf86ff7ccd6ac7c509
Detection ratio: 8 / 48
First submission: 2014-01-19 18:16:37 GMT
VirusTotal link: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/2625676a0b33b5e6798763d7cab0317b180f168b25faf522f3bc01e87476df4e/analysis/
Malwr analysis: https://malwr.com/analysis/OTdlNTQ5YWFjYzEzNDFkYTliMmFlYzJhNzYxZjliNTU/
FINAL NOTES
Once again, here are the associated files:
- ZIP of the PCAP: 2014-01-19-asprox-traffic-from-infected-host.pcap.zip
- ZIP file of the malware: 2014-01-19-asprox-malware.zip
ZIP files are password-protected with the standard password. If you don't know it, look at the "about" page of this website.
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